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Introduction
Economic performance is one of the best predictors of election outcomes (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000) . Yet, the mechanisms by which money flowing through people's pockets and communities maps into votes is much less clear (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg, 2014) . Indeed, some of the more robust findings from this literature, such as the sociotropic hypothesis-national economic conditions seem to matter more to voters than their own personal economic experiences-continue to inspire debate decades after they were first identified (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck, 2011 ).
The continuing struggle to understand the mechanisms of economic voting is largely due to the coarse data available. Almost all of the evidence about the individual-level effects of economic circumstances comes from survey questions that depend on recollections.
Moreover, these recollections are elicited at only a single point in time: right before or right after an election (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000) . This is potentially problematic as partisan preferences, limited human memory, and other factors might color subjective assessments, making such survey data less than ideal (Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs, 1997) .
Using improved data that links a nationally-representative election survey to comprehensive personal financial information, we examine three long-standing debates in the economic voting literature: pocketbook versus sociotropic voting, the effects of partisanship on economic views, and whether or not voters are myopic. The personal financial data provide an individual's history of income and assets, as verified by their tax returns, over a complete four-year term of a government. Merging this data with a detailed national election survey allows us to directly analyze the impact that an individual's financial history has on economic evaluations, vote choice, and political preferences. The results suggest that that previous conclusions in the debates mentioned above may need to be revised.
In particular, we demonstrate that pocketbook considerations-that is personal economic circumstances-are, in our data, at least as important as sociotropic ones. Traditional anal-1 yses of the survey data we use support the prior conclusion in the literature that sociotropic motivations have the greatest influence on voters. But those same voters are shown to actually vote equally on the basis of their pocketbooks when personal financial data is added to the analysis. Further, we use our data to examine the sources of bias and inaccuracy in economic perceptions, and show that after personal economic conditions are taken into account, partisanship is still an important predictor of economic evaluations. Finally, when focusing on personal financial circumstances, vote choice does not exhibit an end-year bias-an over-weighting of economic information in the final year(s) of a government's term-counter to prior research. In particular, we demonstrate that respondents put the most weight on income changes in the first year of the government's term, which, in our study, coincides with the government's implementation of a large tax cut.
Together, the results show that our understanding of economic voting depends crucially on the quality of available data. Fine-grained personal financial data show the hidden impact of pocketbook considerations, the nature of partisan bias in economic perceptions, and the way that personal economic experiences over time affect vote choice.
Background
Our data covers the 2010 election, and the previous four years of personal income, in Sweden.
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While there are theoretical reasons to believe that economic voting in Sweden may not generalize to other places-in particular, Sweden has a small open economy (Duch and Stevenson, 2008 )-our study encompasses two results that suggest otherwise. First, when examining survey data on economic perceptions, Swedish voters appear sociotropic, just like voters in other countries. Second, Swedes appear, in survey experiments, to suffer from end-year bias-just like voters in the U.S. (Healy and Lenz, 2014) .
Ahead of the 2006 election, the four center-right parties (the Moderates, the Center Party, the Liberal People's Party, and the Christian Democrats) formed a coalition, the Alliance for Sweden (henceforth the Alliance). The Alliance won the 2006 election and formed a majority coalition government, ending 12 years of rule by the Social Democrats.
The campaign of 2006 focused heavily on the domestic economy, and employment was seen as the most important issue among voters (Widfeldt, 2007) . Soon after the election, the Alliance enacted new economic policies. A central part of their program was large reductions in taxes for those with low and middle incomes. The first tax reduction was introduced in January 2007, and new tax reductions followed each year during the Alliance's term.
However, in order to encourage work, these tax reductions only applied to labor income, and not to other forms of income such as disability benefits, unemployment insurance, pensions, and so on. Moreover, the Alliance increased fees for unemployment insurance, decreased the levels of unemployment benefits, and repealed wealth taxes. In 2010, the Alliance successfully defended its economic record, convincing voters that Sweden had handled the external factors causing the great recession better than most other countries in Europe and elsewhere. Although the Alliance increased its vote share, it lost its majority position due to the rising popularity of the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats (Widfeldt, 2011) . The Alliance was, however, still the largest block, with 172 seats in parliament, followed by Red-Greens-a coalition consisting of the Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left Party-which amassed 157 seats. 
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Economic Voting in Sweden
As studies of economic voting are conducted in many different countries, and often focus on the U.S. case, the generalizability of our conclusions relies on whether Swedish voters are different than voters elsewhere. At least for the phenomena we examine, Swedish voters look remarkably like voters elsewhere in traditional, survey-based, studies.
Most recent studies have concluded that Swedish voting behavior, and the importance Swedes place on economic conditions, closely resembles economic voting in other countries (Martinsson, 2013) . A number of papers based on the Swedish National Election Study (SNES) find that sociotropic considerations dominate pocketbook ones (Jordahl, 2006; Holmberg, 1984; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987; Gilljam and Holmberg, 1993; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2004) . Thus, survey evidence from Sweden conforms to the conventional wisdom established in the U.S. and several other countries: the economy matters, and sociotropic evaluations matter substantially more than pocketbook ones (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979) .
We confirm these previous results from Sweden in Section 3. Moreover, we replicate the survey-based experiment of Healy and Lenz (2014) and show that the results match the U.S.
results closely: Swedish voters appear myopic in the data from this experiment. While this cannot prove that the differences between our findings and the previous literature are solely due to superior data, it is strongly consistent with that hypothesis.
Despite these empirical facts, there remain theoretical concerns: in particular, Sweden is a multi-party parliamentary democracy with a small, open economy. The parliamentary system makes it easier for voters to assign credit or blame to the incumbent government for economic circumstances. However, the multi-party nature of that government, and the size of the economy, make this harder (Duch and Stevenson, 2008) . Because the electoral coalitions in Sweden were known ahead of the 2010 election, we can mitigate concerns about coalition governments by coding a vote for any member of the incumbent coalition a vote for the incumbent (1), and a vote for any other party as a vote against (0). There is little to be done about the fact that Sweden's economy is small in global terms. However, it is worth noting that the results in Section 5 show voters rewarding the government much more for tax cuts in their first year in office than punishing them for changes in income due to the great recession in the second and third years.
Economic Voting
The economic voting literature consists of a large number of sub-literatures. Due to the nature of our data, we are able to examine three inter-related topics that are usually considered in isolation. As such, we consider the literature on each separately.
A large portion of the economic voting literature attempts to discern whether voters have pocketbook or sociotropic motivations, settling on the latter (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck, 2011) . 2 A common interpretation of this conclusion is that voters are motivated by public interest (Lewin, 1991) . Others argue that voters are self interested, and the apparent importance of sociotropic evaluations occurs because the national economy is a clearer signal of governmental performance than personal economic experiences (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg, 2014; Kramer, 1983; Peltzman, 1990) .
Our findings suggest that it is unlikely voters are primarily motivated by the public interest, and that it is researchers, not voters, who are hobbled by the noisiness of personal economic data. However, to our knowledge, no study has examined how pocketbook evaluations relate to verified, comprehensive, personal financial data.
The pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations that are the basis for studies in the preceding paragraph have come in for their fair share of criticism. In particular, several studies argue that these evaluations reflect political, rather than economic, considerations. That is, voters decide who they are going to vote for, and then report an economic evaluation that conforms with that choice (Chzhen, Evans and Pickup, 2014; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Pickup, 2010, 2013; van der Eijk et al., 2007; Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs, 1997) . Equally, perceptions might be colored by a "partisan lens" that leads voster to view the same economic events more favorably if their preferred party is in office (Zaller, 1992) . We show that once real economic conditions are taken into account, partisanship still explains some of the voters' economic evaluation, demonstrating that these contain both real economic information and partisan bias. 3 However, to tease apart these two contributors to economic evaluations, fine-grained financial data is necessary.
Additionally, many studies argue that voters are poorly informed, and thus subjective evaluations will be noisy (Bartels, 1996; Conover, Feldman and Knight, 1986; Hellwig and 2 The part of this literature most closely related to our study compares sociotropic evaluations to actual national and regional conditions (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg, 2014; Bisgaard, Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2016; Stimson, 1992, 2002; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger, 2013) .
3 A final study of particular note is recent work by that, as with our paper, combines survey and registrar data in a Scandinavian country-in their case Denmark-to examine economic voting. The closest relationship is in our Section 4: there, we focus on the portion of economic evaluations driven by partisanship, while they focus on how providing information causes changes economic perceptions and reported vote choice. Marinova, 2015; Kramer, 1983) . Presumably, the level of noise should vary with political sophistication (Alt, Lassen and Marshall, 2016; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000) . Surprisingly, there is no general agreement in the direction of the relationship. Low-sophistication voters may require media cues to make economic evaluations, and thus, sociotropic evaluations may be more accurate for these voters than pocketbook evaluations (Mutz, 1992 (Mutz, , 1994 .
On the other hand, the lack of sophistication may make it difficult for low-sophistication voters to incorporate external information, making pocketbook evaluations more accurate (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1997) . We find that increased political sophistication is associated with more accurate pocketbook assessments.
Concerns have also been raised about voters' abilities to retain and use economic information from early in a government's term.
4 However, there is some disagreement over whether this reflects rational concerns-as it usually takes some time for economic policy to filter through to economic outcomes (Hibbs, 1987; Erikson, 1989 )-or a myopic bias (Healy and Lenz, 2014; Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012) . The latter is of particular concern as it limits democratic accountability, and may lead to inefficient attempts at economic manipulation (Abrams, 2006; Achen and Bartels, 2004) . However, the evidence in all cases come from surveys or aggregate data. By examining actual personal economic information, we reveal patterns that are incompatible with voter myopia. Namely, in our setting, voters place most weight on economic information from the beginning of the incumbent government's term, which corresponding to a large tax cut-the government's most important economic policy.
On the whole, then, voters seem decently well informed, at least about their own personal economic circumstances, and seem to use their information rationally. While much of the economic voting literature above disagrees with this conclusion, proponents of macropolitics have routinely argued that, on average, voters make very good projections about future economic conditions, and this influences both their partisanship and vote choice. (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 1989 , 2002 . 5 Our findings are broadly consistent with this perspective.
Data
Most prior studies of economic voting rely on voters' economic evaluations at a single point in time, or aggregate government statistics on the economy and elections. A number of factors have pushed researchers towards these measurement techniques. First, conventional wisdom holds that quantities are difficult to ask about on surveys, and thus, self-reported income measures have reliability problems (Micklewright and Schnepf, 2010; Moore and Welniak, 2000; Yan, Curtin and Jans, 2010) . 6 Second, recollections of income across time may exceed limited human memory (Withey, 1954) .
By combining detailed and verified data on income with survey data, it possible to address topics that prior research, lacking such data, has been unable to address. Our survey data 6 However, see Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2013) for a discussion on how to best measure quantities in surveys.
7 Voter turnout was validated with the official registers, and this information is used to correct reported vote choice. Note that turnout in Sweden is quite high: since 1960 it has been greater than 80%. Our analyses focus on household disposable income as, in most cases, this best reflects the "true parameter of interest" (Kramer, 1983) -that is, economic conditions that can fairly be attributed to the government. An individual's personal income will give an inaccurate picture when his or her partner has significantly higher or lower income. Total income, as opposed to disposable income, will give an inaccurate picture when tax rates and other obligatory expenses vary.
Throughout, we present results from both the full sample and a stable sample. The latter consists of households whose composition remained the same from 2006 to 2010. Household income is affected by the number of adults living in a household. This may change due to divorce, death, a retired parent moving in, or a grown child moving out. As such, our stable sample considers households that went through no such changes from 2006 to 2010. The stable sample also leaves out those that were retired, as they experience very little change in income.
10 Of the full sample, 60.8% are in the stable sample, and a further 11.8% are retired. In general, results in both samples are quite similar.
Sociotropic and Pocketbook Voting
We begin our analysis of the data by re-examining a central finding of the economic voting literature: voters are sociotropic. Instead, we find that the portion of pocketbook evaluations that corresponds to real economic conditions is highly correlated with vote choice. This leads naturally into the next two sections, where we first examine what makes up the rest of pocketbook evaluations, finding that it is partisan bias and random noise. Finally, we examine how vote choice is affected by personal economic conditions across time.
A voluminous literature documents that voters seem to rely more on evaluations of the national economy (sociotropic) rather than personal economic circumstances (pocketbook) in choosing who to vote for (Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck, 2011; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; LewisBeck and Paldam, 2000) . This finding is so ingrained that scholars often forget just how puzzling it is: personal economic experiences are salient and directly experienced, while national economic conditions need to be gleaned from news sources or, possibly, one's surroundings (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg, 2014; Grafstein, 2009; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981) .
As Fiorina (1981, p. 5) notes, pocketbook voting is theoretically more robust, because, "In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare" [emphasis ours].
Here, we document that, taking account of voters' actual economic circumstances, pocketbook and sociotropic considerations are equally important. To measure sociotropic and pocketbook considerations, we use the answers to two questions that have been extensively studied in the economic voting literature. Sociotropic evaluations come from answers to:
Would you say the the economic situation in Sweden has improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse, compared with the situation 12 months ago?
whereas the pocketbook evaluation comes from:
If you compare your economic situation with what it was 12 months ago, has it improved, stayed the same, or has it gotten worse?
Both questions allow responses on the same five-point scale, from "much worse", which we code as 1, to "much better", which we code as 5.
The role of raw sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations in vote choice are analyzed in Table 1 . In all columns, the dependent variable is whether or not a respondent, whose turnout has been verified, reported a vote for the incumbent Alliance (coded 1), or a vote for a non-incumbent party (coded 0). This is regressed on sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, and, in some cases, controls, using ordinary least squares (OLS).
11 The first set of regressions uses the stable sample, as defined in Section 2.3, and the second set uses all respondents that answered these questions.
The first two columns report the standard analysis in this literature, using just survey data, and show the standard result: sociotropic evaluations appear to be much more important than pocketbook ones in determining vote choice. The addition of controls has little effect. This is reassuring as it matches the extant economic voting literature in both the U.S. and Sweden, emphasizing the general applicability of the results of our further analyses.
To understand the effect of personal economic circumstances on vote choice, and compare it with the effect of sociotropic evaluations, we first project pocketbook evaluations onto actual economic circumstances as observed in the register data. That is, we implement a two-staged-least-squares (2SLS) procedure to isolate the relationship between vote choice and the portion of the pocketbook evaluation that is correlated with actual economic conditions.
The results of this 2SLS procedure for the Stable Sample are displayed in the third and fourth column of Table 1 . In particular, we regress pocketbook evaluations on economic circumstances-the change in household income in the year preceding the election (2009) (2010) , and baseline income in 2009. We use the change in the year prior to the election, as this matches the period of time in the evaluative question. 12 We represent the change in income with two variables to separate out the effects of small to moderate income shocks (below 20%) from very large income shocks, so that our specifications will not be overly influenced by outliers.
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11 We avoid discrete choice specifications, such as probit or logit, as these can produce biased and inconsistent coefficients when the dependent variable is measured with error (Hausman, 2001) . As the dependent variable here comes from a self-report, we cannot be confident that it is exactly measured.
12 Including changes in preceding years, as in Section 5, has little effect. 13 In particular, income shocks of less than 20% are represented linearly, and those that are greater than 20% are indicated in a second, dummy, variable. The F-statistic on excluding these instruments is usually well above 10 ( Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2012) .The results of this first-stage specification can be found in Appendix B. When the projections from this first stage are entered in a second stage regression, the results are striking. Pocketbook considerations go from being a distant also-ran to as important as sociotropic ones. However, the fact that coefficients on sociotropic evaluations decrease only slightly implies that they contain additional information beyond personal economic circumstances. 14 This is true whether one examines just the Stable Sample, or the full sample of respondents (Columns 5-8).
The 2SLS estimates provide strong evidence that pocketbook considerations are more important than previously appreciated, and call into question the common interpretation of sociotropic voting: that voters are primarily motivated by public interest rather than their own self-interest (Lewin, 1991 
Bias and Accuracy in Pocketbook Evaluations
As noted in the previous section, there is substantial noise in pocketbook evaluations. Prior scholarship contends that this noise is driven by partisan bias. Figure 2 illustrates this concern: those who report that their personal economic circumstances are "much better" than a year ago are much more likely to vote for the incumbent than those that report it is "much worse". However, this result leaves the direction of causality unclear. Are they voting for the incumbent because their economic circumstances have improved? Or do they report that their economic circumstances have improved because they are voting for the incumbent for non-economic, possibly partisan, reasons?
Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.2, the relationship between the level of noise in subjective evaluations and political sophistication is unclear, both theoretically and empirically. We can reject out of hand the idea that pocketbook evaluations are only noise: if that were the case then actual economic circumstances would not explain pocketbook evaluations, counter to the findings in the previous section. We can illustrate this another way: Figure 3 shows that those who reported improved economic circumstances over the previous year indeed experienced greater increases in income than those who reported their personal circumstances got worse.
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A deeper examination of our data can provide additional insights into the bias and accuracy of pocketbook evaluations. To analyze sources of bias in economic evaluations, we first regress the pocketbook evaluation on actual economic circumstances-as in the first stage specification underlying Table 1 -and generate residuals. These residuals are the difference between evaluations of two people with the same economic circumstances, so predictors of these residuals are predictors of bias. 17 We regress the residuals on measures of partisanship, political knowledge, and a host of demographic characteristics. In Table   2 we find clear evidence of partisan bias in reported economic evaluations. In particular, once actual economic circumstances are taken into account, those who plan to vote for the incumbent Alliance report more favorable economic evaluations.
To reduce concerns that unobserved factors may be driving both the residual of economic However, the biases uncovered in Table 2 may just be reflective of general inaccuracies in economic evaluations among people of a given political persuasion. To test this, we regress the absolute value of the residual from economic evaluations on the same variables as in Table 2 . The results are in Table 3 . There is little evidence that anything other than general political knowledge (measured as the number of correct answers to 18 general political knowledge questions), and possibly immigration status, are related to accuracy of economic evaluations. However, these results need to be interpreted carefully as "accuracy" here is defined as the closeness of a respondent's reported economic evaluations to the average of others with the same economic experiences. Nevertheless, it suggests that inaccuracies in economic evaluations do not drive the patterns of bias among Alliance or opposition voters.
It is important to note two things. First, the prior literature uses panel data to provide evidence of partisan bias in economic evaluations. This requires (reasonable) assumptions about the dynamics of partisanship, or that other economic events (such as a job loss) are correctly reported, while economic evaluations are subject to partisan bias. Personal financial data allows for the separate identification of economic and political contributions to economic evaluations, and shows they are both important. Second, our results only apply to pocketbook evaluations, as we cannot control for the relevant variation in macroeconomic information that would be needed to examine sociotropic evaluations.
18 However, the macropolitics literature, discussed in Section 2.2, has shown that voter's forecasts of aggregate economic outcomes are, on average, quite good, so there are other indications that sociotropic evaluations-at least of the prospective variety-contain important economic information as well.
Up until this point we have largely examined election-year income changes, as this is the quantity asked about in retrospective economic evaluations. The literature provides
18 Conducting the same exercise as in Table 2 with sociotropic evaluations leads to a significant coefficient on partisanship, as implied by the results in Table 1 . However, as this is only controlling for personal economic experiences, rather than variation in macroeconomic information, these results are, unfortunately, not very useful. another reason for focusing on this quantity: voters are thought to be myopic, primarily using election-year changes when making voting decisions. Our data allows us to examine this conclusion, and we do so in the next section.
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Is the Economic Vote Myopic?
Much of the evidence for end-year myopia comes from surveys, survey experiments, and aggregate statistics. Each is potentially problematic. Surveys, administered at one point in time, only consider a single aggregate economy. Survey experiments assume that voters' reported responses to hypothetical economic conditions are representative of the way that they process real economic information. Aggregate statistics provide little detail on mechanisms mechanisms, making it difficult to distinguish a rational focus on the end of a government's term (Hibbs, 1987 ) from a myopic bias.
Our data presents a unique and novel opportunity to test whether such end-year myopia appears when we examine voters' income across a government's term. To argue that our results generalize, we first verify that Swedish voters respond in the same way as U.S. voters to hypothetical economic conditions in survey experiments. We do so by replicating the experiment of Healy and Lenz (2014) in two Swedish surveys. 19 We then proceed to examine how vote choice responds to real changes in household income. We find, contrary to the existing survey-based evidence (including our own), that Swedish voters put the most weight on personal income changes early in a government's term. While this may seem puzzling, it is actually heartening: as shown in Figure 1 the incumbent government's largest impact on disposable income was felt in the first year of its term, when it sharply cut taxes.
The survey experiment we replicate asks respondents to rate graphs of the economic performance of a government. This is operationalized by showing respondents four bars illustrating the growth rate in each year of the government's term. 20 The graphical representations are hypothetical: we use the same 25 pictures used in Healy and Lenz (2014) , in which each year was independently drawn from a normal distribution parameterized by the first and second moments of postwar yearly growth in the U.S. We supplement this with an-other 100 hypothetical economic records that are drawn according to a normal distribution parameterized by the first and second moments of postwar yearly growth in Sweden. Thus, some economic records showed steady growth, others showed brief or long-lasting recessions, and some big changes in growth rates.
Our experiment ran on a probability-sampled representative survey of 584 Swedes. As
Healy and Lenz (2014) largely conducted their experiment on a convenience sample-Mechanical Turk-we also ran our experiment on 1,374 Swedes in an opt-in (convenience) sample.
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Those in the opt-in sample were shown five hypothetical economic records-two with U.S. growth rates and three with Swedish growth rates, while those in the probability sample were shown seven hypothetical economies-three with U.S. growth rates, and four with Swedish growth rates. Participants were informed that the plots represented growth rates in national average levels of personal income from a government's second term, and were asked to assess, on a four point scale, how good the economy was during the term. Table 4 analyzes the results of this experiment. The analysis follows the structure in Healy and Lenz (2014). In particular, we regress each assessment of each hypothetical economy on the growth rates presented in those graphs. We include respondent-specific fixed effects so that the identifying variation is within person. Moreover, we cluster standard errors by hypothetical economy, as this is the unit of "treatment".
The results for our Swedish sample replicate those in Healy and Lenz's U.S. sample.
Swedish voters heavily over-weight economic growth in the final years of the government's term-especially the last year. Indeed, the coefficient on final-year economic growth is significantly larger than the coefficients on any other year. This is true regardless of whether the economic records are meant to mimic the U.S. or Sweden. Moreover, the result is the same whether one examines the representative sample or the probability sample.
Having established that Swedes show the same kind of end-year bias in national economic 21 The survey experiment was conducted in the "Citizen Panel" at the Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE) hosted by the Multidisciplinary Opinion and Democracy Research Group (MOD) at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Notes: * * * , * * , * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, with standard errors clustered by economy (picture) in parentheses. All specifications include respondent fixed effects.
evaluations as U.S. voters on a survey experiment, we turn to the register data on personal income. In particular, in Table 5 we regress an indicator for whether the respondent voted for the incumbent center-right Alliance on changes in (logged) household disposable income over the Alliance's term. In all cases, the specifications show that the most important yearly changes in disposable income were in the first years of the Alliance's government. Baseline income-in 2006-also increases the probability that the respondent voted for the Alliance, reflecting the general finding that higher income is associated with right-leaning political views. While the emphasis on income growth in the early years of the Alliance's term is unexpected, it is consistent with the fact that the most important economic changes-ones that impacted disposable income immediately-were implemented in the Alliance's first year in office, as discussed in Section 2 and shown in Figure 1 . it reduces the sample size by more than one-half, and reduces the coefficients on all years.
However, changes in disposable income in the early years of the government's term are still the most important correlates of vote choice.
A concern with this analysis is that the results may be affected by outliers-respondents with particularly large changes in income. Therefore, we rerun the model in the first column of Table 5 , varying the threshold of income change at which we drop an observation. We start by including those that had less than a 30% change in income in all years (932 persons), and then gradually expand the sample by increasing the cutoff 5 percentage points at a time.
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The four coefficients on income changes, and their 95% confidence intervals are displayed in A plausible, simple, view of these findings is that those who benefitted from a large tax cut in the first year of the Alliance's term were most likely to vote to re-elect. This is inconsistent with a view of voters as suffering from a myopic bias. Perhaps more importantly, this is consistent with a view of democratic accountability with self-interested preferences.
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22 We continue to do so up to the value of 300 percent. Households with larger income changes represent less than 0.25 percent of the sample.
23 There is a moderate negative correlation (−0.3) between changes in income in the first three years of the Alliance's term-or the first two changes. This suggests that those who benefited the most from the Alliance's tax cut were also hardest hit by the recession. This is interesting as it suggests that voters correctly gave the government credit for the increase in disposable income in the first year, but did not incorrectly Coefficient Estimate (with 95% CI)
Maximum Percentage Change in Income for Sample Inclusion
We thus conclude in the next section by summarizing our results and discussing how they relate to democratic accountability.
Discussion
By augmenting survey data with detailed personal financial data from tax records and other government sources, we are able to revisit three findings from the economic voting literature. Taken together, our analyses show that survey and aggregate data can obscure, and blame the government for the decrease in disposable income the next year-this decrease was due to events outside the government's control, the worldwide great recession.
sometimes mislead, researchers about how voters behave.
To summarize: we find that pocketbook evaluations contain real information about economic experiences, and the evaluations based on those experiences are important in determining vote choice. Moreover, the personal financial data provide clear evedince on the effect of partisan bias in economic perceptions on voting decisions. Finally, in our data, economic evaluations are largely driven by changes in income during the first year of the government's term, when the biggest changes in policy occurred. This shows that voters are not myopic when it comes to their personal financial circumstances. In addition, their economic perceptions are plausibly driven by policy outcomes.
These findings have implications that extend beyond the economic voting literature to more general questions about democratic accountability. Indeed, findings from the economic voting literature have been used to suggest that voters may be easy to manipulate, and thus have limited ability to control politicians. For example, it has been suggested that the fact that voters seem to display end-year myopia can be exploited by incumbents artificially pumping up the economy in the final year of their term to mask otherwise poor economic records (Abrams, 2006; Achen and Bartels, 2004) . Moreover, if voters ignore their own personal economic information they may be more reliant on the media for information used to evaluate governments (Hetherington, 1996) , opening themselves to further manipulation. Yet our findings suggest that voters are not myopic and use their own economic information. This warrants a reduction in cynicism about voter's rationality, and ability to exercise democratic accountability.
An easy retort would be that our study considers Swedish citizens, who are different in a number of ways. However, previous scholars, and our own results, suggest that when it comes to economic voting, Swedes look remarkably like U.S. citizens-at least in conventional analyses. Thus, we find the explanation that the differences in findings between this work and the previous literature is largely due to better data more likely than vague hypothesis about cultural differences. However, we acknowledge that analyses of finer-grained data in 25 the U.S., or other countries, may produce far different results than what we find here.
We look forward to these analyses. For now, the only thing that is certain is that the increasing availability of personal income data promises to change our understanding of economic voting.
Online Appendix-Not Intended for Publication
A Additional Information on the Register Data
Household disposable income is defined as gross wage and salary income, plus income from public sources, plus income from pensions and other annuities, minus taxes, summed to the household level. We also have data on the number of "consumption units" in a household, and pension income, which we use to determine the stable households, and those households with retired persons, respectively. Detailed information on the data in the Income and Taxation
Register can be found at http://www.scb.se/sv /Vara-tjanster/Bestalla-mikrodata/Vilkamikrodata-finns/Registret-over-inkomster-och-taxeringar-IoT/. Online Appendix-1 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals 1 for those voting for the incumbent centre-right Alliance and 0 for those voting for opposition parties. For a description of the Stable Sample, see Section 2.3. Controls include: age, age squared, education, gender, marital status, immigrant, and education, which are the independent variables in Table 3 .
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